An Approach to Log Management: Prototyping a Design of Agent for Log
  Harvesting by Reinaldo, Mayol Arnao et al.
An Approach to Log Management: 
Prototyping a Design of Agent for Log 
Harvesting. 
Reinaldo N. Mayol Arnao 
<reinaldo.mayol@upb.edu.co> 
Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana y Universidad Industrial de Santander, Colombia 
Luis A. Núñez  
<lnunez@uis.edu.co> 
Universidad Industrial de Santander, Colombia 
Antonio Lobo  
<alobo@uis.edu.co> 
Universidad Industrial de Santander, Colombia 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the 
financial support of the Vicerrectoría de 
Investigación y Extensión de la Universidad 
Industrial de Santander under project 
GridUIS2 5541 
1. Abstract 
This paper describes a work in progress 
implementing a solution for harvesting and 
transporting  information logs from network 
devices in a e-science environment. The system is 
composed for servers, agents , active devices and 
a transporting protocol.  
This document describes the state of 
development of agents. Agents capture logs from 
devices, normalize, reduce and cataloged them 
by using metadata. Once all these processes are 
done, they transmit the cataloged data by using 
Transportation Protocol to a warehouse server.  
Also an agent use orchestration parameters to 
transmit modified logs to a data warehouse 
server. These parameters can be received from 
orchestration applications such as Taverna.  
The operation of the agents and the 
communication protocol solve some of the 
deficiencies of traditional logs management 
protocols. Finally, we show some test realized 
over the new prototype.  
2. Introduction 
The traditional log management process includes 
several stages.  The process begins when an 
application (for example a firewall daemon) 
generates an event (for example a IP packet that 
has been rejected) and writes its description, 
using an application1  log format.  In the second 
phase, if a log harvest system has been 
configured, the system log generates a network 
message for each event described in logs. This 
message is sent to storage a warehouse server. If 
the log harvest system is not set, logs are 
maintained local and it cannot be used for any 
type of process out of its environment. Usually in 
a production device, there are not possibilities for 
analysis, so in the best case, simple procedures of 
organizing information are made. 
Important information concerning of networking 
management strategies is recorded in logs of 
most of the network devices. Today it is 
                                               
1
 For simplicity the term applications is used  but could 
refer to processes that do not correspond (as in the 
example) to the application layer of TCP / IP model 
(or OSI). 
indispensable to obtain and process this 
information using sophisticated data mining 
techniques looking for patterns, trends or even, 
to detect specific acts that, in a certain context, 
can be considered as evidences for insecurity or 
malfunction. To accomplish it, with current 
conventional protocols2 and working 
environments, have serious difficulties, among 
which is possible to mention:[1][2] 
 The great diversity of security and 
telecommunication devices i.e., routers, 
firewalls, intruder detectors, antivirus 
systems, applications servers, among others. 
 
 There is not one an accepted standard for the 
generation of logs. Each manufacturer (or 
even each model) generates information logs 
in different formats. For example, the IBM 
Autonomic Toolkit has defined 280 logs 
different formats. [3] 
 
 Volumes of security and network operation 
information are very large, for example 
tracking activity of a local network can 
generate several gigabits of information per 
day.[4] [5] 
 
 Volumes of scientific and commercial data 
have exploited. Today the capacities to mine 
data are lower than the posibility to generate 
them, and security incidents related have 
also increased exponentially.[6] [7] 
 
 The computational power for management 
and analysis of logs (especially for 
correlational analysis) is very demanding. This 
makes it very difficult to obtain various 
“points of view” of information coming from 
logs, which is necessary for its correct 
analysis and interpretation of the 
information.    
 
 The log information is perishable and volatile. 
Its preservation can be affected by its 
lifecycle and the storage and computing 
capacities of the corresponding devices that 
generate log.[8]  
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  Syslog, UDP and TCP. 
 Finally, the general accepted log transport 
mechanism (using Syslog daemon over UCP 
or TCP connections) has serious limits from 
performance, security, orchestration and 
mobile device identification.  
Current most popular protocol used for harvest-
transportation is Syslog[13]. In [15][16][5] are 
analyzed some limitations of this protocol. The 
most important limitations are: 
 
 
1. It does not mechanisms to ensure:  
a. Data integrity.3 
b. Confidentiality of information. 
c. Authenticity at the ends of the 
connection.  
d. Clock synchronism among 
information sources.  
e. Time stamping of logs. 
f. Fault tolerance 
2. The system is vulnerable to denial of service 
attacks, because one message is transmitted 
by each event (and no matter if this is 
repeated). 
 
3. The system does not use a data compression 
mechanism. 
4. The system cannot be orchestrated4.  
5. A single standard log format is not 
supported. This limits the real possibilities of 
data analysis. 
6. The device identification is made by precarious 
mechanisms such as IP addresses or fully 
qualified domain names. This mechanism is 
not acceptable for mobile devices that can 
                                               
3
 Limitations 1, 2 and 3 refer to the RFC described 
syslog protocol. There are some applications (for 
example rsyslog[66]) that have resolved this 
situation by using TLS. 
4
 An orchestration model provides an environment 
specifically focused on the needs of a 
participant. These needs may change over time. 
change its IP and generally do not have fully 
qualified domain names. 
In [17](CLCAR 2010) we analyze some other 
limitations that appear when we tested 
Orchestration Applications to log management.  
 
3. The proposed system description 
 
In this work we present a system composed by 
Servers, Agents and Transportation Protocol. 
Servers storage information logs as syslog-like 
warehouse. Agents capture logs from devices, 
normalize, reduce and cataloged them by using 
metadata. Once all these processes are done, 
they transmit the cataloged data by using 
Transportation Protocol.  The Figure 1 shows this 
process.   
Along this paper, we shall describe the agents 
that : 
 Harvest logs from network devices. 
 Compress the information using 
frequency method. 
 Send logs to a data warehouse through a 
new transportation protocol. 
 Label the record with the appropriated 
metadata.  
 Unifies logs format using Common Base 
Events (CBE) format. 
 
3.1 Agents 
An Agent is a software element that receives data 
logs from devices (local or remote) by using a TCP 
port, modify and transmit them to a data 
warehouse server. Agents use the difference 
between occurrence frequency expressions to 
reduce (compress) logs and normalize them to 
CBE format.  
Agents are responsible of process for log from 
network devices and communication with 
servers, using transport protocol. The 
communication between the device and the 
agents occurs by a standard TCP port.  
 
Figure 1 The system proposed 
 
 Each agent has three data interfaces: 
- Capturing Interface: This interface interacts 
with the Device Log Systems,  reads log lines 
and send them to a data warehouse.   
- Transporting Interface: This interface is used 
for communication with the data warehouse 
server by using a transport protocol.   
- Controlling Interface: This interface is used 
for agent operation and orchestration 
activity.  It uses any TCP port according to the 
orchestration application settings.  
 
 Agents are responsible of important functions 
such as: 
- Data Compression: The data compression 
will be performed by using a scanning 
frequency mechanism for regular expressions 
within the logs.[18] In a significant amount of 
logs, fixed expressions has high frequency of 
occurrence, for example:   
 Server ::: is down 
 User::: is connected in 
terminal ::: 
 ::: interface is link down 
These are the fixed expressions.  
 
Other expressions with a low occurrence 
frequencies correspond to particular names 
(user, daemons, interfaces) and are 
considered  variable expressions.  We use the 
occurrence frequency differences to establish 
a compression mechanism which records the 
line number and position (into log file) of 
each regular or variable expression.  A similar 
mechanism (but only for knowing extract) is 
described in [18]. 
- Data Normalization: As it has been 
mentioned above that many log formats 
exist. Log format will be transformed CBE 
format. CBE is a common XML format that 
can be used for the representations of 
system events.[5] 
- Data Security:  Logs must be digitally signed 
before being transmitted. Additionally, the 
communication between Agents and 
Orchestration Application must be 
authenticated using Digital Certificates.  
- Digital Certificate Management: Digital 
signatures comply X.509 v3 Digital 
Certificates. Agents store its Digital 
Certificates in a protected area.  Protected 
Area is like a cryptographic key ring.  
- Control Interface:  The control interface is 
used to change some parameters for 
orchestration process, such as: server 
warehouse, kind of logs that must be 
recollected, cryptography control interface 
and others.  
- First Level of Metadata Characterization: 
Two levels of metadata are established. The 
first level is used to describe time type of 
device and geographic location, data quality, 
harvest conditions and others parameters. 
The second level is used to replace raw data 
by identifiers constructed from frequency 
analysis.[13] 
An agent use orchestration parameters to 
transmit modified logs to a data warehouse 
server. This transmission is made with a new 
Transportation Protocol which ensures that the  
information transmitted is cryptographically 
protected using Digital Certificates and both 
communication ends are authenticated.  
The detailed explanation Transportation Protocol 
proposed is outside the scope of this paper. For 
this reason we show here only some important 
details.The transportation protocol is responsible 
for defining the communication among agents 
and warehouse servers and devices. This protocol 
must: 
a) Use cryptographic authentication 
methods5, instead of actual used IP 
address6, as end identification system.  
b) Support cryptographic methods to 
encrypt data logs transfer. 
c)  Offer clock synchronisms between 
agents, devices and servers.  
d) Use a fixed header. Any other necessary 
information must be transmitted in an 
extension header.  
The figure 2 shows the process for data (logs) 
interchange between an agent and a server using 
the transportation Protocol. As mentioned above 
the transportation protocol is the same between 
agents and servers or between agents and 
devices. 
 
Figure 2 Data Interchange between Agents and 
Servers. Ku represents the Public Key of 
Devices and Agents. Ks is the Session Key 
interchanged using Deffie-Hellman Protocol. 
 
                                               
5
 Digital Certificates  
6
 Or Fully Qualified Domain Names 
The figure 3 shows the structure of a message 
between agents and devices (or Servers in 
future).  Agent ID is an identifier implemented by 
the agent digital certificate. Similarly, the Server 
ID is an identifier for this (and for other) type of 
device. The validation parameter defines the time 
until the message should be accepted by the 
agent. Message ID is a serial number used as 
identification in messages.  Signature Protocol 
identifies the protocol used as hash function in 
Digital Signature, by default SHA-2. Encryption 
protocol defines the protocol used for data 
symmetric encryption; by default we have 
implemented AES. Message type specifies 128 
types of message7. Finally, Message Signature is 
its digital signature.  Message type must include 
the message priority like the syslog model, but 
using other message classification. [13] 
 
Figure 3 Message Protocol 
 
4. Current Status (Agents) 
This section describes the current status of 
system developed. Presently agents are 
operational and the communication protocol 
(between devices and agents) has been partially 
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 Syslog only have 23 messages models. Some of 
them, like UUCP are obsoletes.  
accomplished. The communications between 
agents and devices has been successfully tested.  
Agents are implemented by using Python script 
language and one exclusive threat is established 
for each device connected. Currently, devices 
begin the communication process, but in the near 
future agents will instruct the device to send 
specific information to the selected agent. Figure 
3 shows an agent waiting for connections from 
devices.  Figure 4 show 2 devices (in this case 
Linux machines) sending information to Agent.    
 
4.1 Agents and Devices ID 
Identification of both ends (agents and devices) 
are implemented by using a hash function over 
MAC address and IP address. IPv4 and IPv6 
address are supported.  When a device contact to 
agents uses the IP address and MAC hash has ID. 
Device use this number (currently 160 bits)  as ID 
before logs can be transported form devices to 
agents. This ID doesn’t change. With this 
approach a device can be always identified even 
if change its IP address or MAC.  
 
Figure 3 An Agent waiting for connections. 
 
 
4.2 Agents and Devices 
Authentication. 
Both agent and device have a Digital Certificate 
(X.509 v3) and a private key. Therefore, both 
ends can be authenticated using a challenge 
protocol.  Before an agent, or a device, can 
exchange data, both must obtain the digital 
certificate of the other from a Certificate 
Authority. This process is not part of the protocol. 
When a device wants to send data to an agent 
generates a challenge (consisting of a 4096-bit 
random number). This challenge is encrypted by 
using the device´s private key and send to agent. 
The agent decrypts the challenge (using the 
device's public key) and encrypts it again but with 
its own private key. The device now decrypts the 
challenge using the agent´s public key. If the 
received value is identical to the generated both 
ends are correct. (see Figure 5) 
This process is now implemented using RSA 
protocol.  The key and certificates can made 
using SSL. 
 
Figure 4 Two devices establishing an SSL 
tunnel with the agent after performing the 
authentication. 
 
 
4.3 Data Confidentiality 
The confidentiality of communications between 
agents and devices is an important element. We 
have implemented the protocol Rinjdael with 
keys of 128 bits.  A session key is exchanged using 
Diffie-Hellman. 
To prevent that a data packet could be captured 
and repeated indiscriminately, session keys has 
time to live (TTL). The TTL is a value in Kilobits. 
When a key was used to encrypt more than the 
amount of data defined by the TTL, it should be 
changed. At that point the device and the agent 
must negotiate a new session key using Deffie-
Hellman protocol. Now we are working in a 
window´s system. If a packet was received then 
other packets with similar number are rejected.  
4.4 Data Integrity 
The data integrity must be preserved. To 
accomplish this, the messages will be digitally 
signed. The version of the agents currently 
implemented using SHA -2. 
We are currently testing an alternative that 
would consume fewer resources, especially 
bandwidth. This is to authenticate 
communications groups instead of individual 
packages. The transmitter (devices or agents) 
generates the signature after that an amount of 
data transmitted. If the signature is incorrect all 
the affected packages should be retransmitted. 
 
4.5 Agent Discovery and Selection 
The devices must define the agent that receives 
information (logs). Devices can discovery agents 
in the same network. 
 To discover agents, devices use the following 
protocol: 
1. Devices send multicast messages and send 
them an Agent-Discovery Message (ADM)8.   
2. When an agent receives the ADM message, it 
sends back a Communications Offer message 
(AOM)9 to device.  
A device can receive offers from many agents 
therefore; the devices could select the agent to 
send information. To do it, devices use   
following protocol: 
1. Select the agent used before. 
2. If the device has never send data before, 
select an agent on the same network. 
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 ADM is a single message with device ID. This 
message is digitally signed.  
9
 AOM is a single message with agent ID. This 
message is digitally signed.  
 
3. If two or more agents are available on the 
same network one of them is randomly 
selected. 
4. If there are no agents in the same network or 
no one sent offers, another agent can be 
used, but must be manually configured.  
5. Tests on agents 
The tests were performed with 8 machines 
running linux (debian) as devices and an 
agent (also debian). 
Each device transmitted 200 Mb from its real log. 
Figure 5 show various devices communicating 
witch an agent during test.  
Figure 5. Various devices transmitting data to 
an agent using Ipv6 address. 
 
 
As result of the tests we found that performance 
drops significantly when number of devices 
simultaneously connected increases with the 
same agent. This can be caused by the selection 
of programming language. This is an expected 
result because the degree of development of the 
project and the objectives in this stage.  
Another test made was to capture and repeat a 
packet indiscriminately in the network.  It was 
confirmed that damage was limited to the period 
of validity of the session keys. 
The tests were conducted using both IPv4 and 
IPv6 (in local-link mode). There were no 
significant differences in performance between 
the two tests. 
 
Finally, tests were performed using decoys and 
false devices and agents. In all cases the tests 
showed that the connections from the 
apocryphal elements were rejected.  
 
6. Conclusions and Future work  
 
The information described in this article is part of 
a larger project designed to create a secure 
distributed environment of e- analysis. Here we 
have described only the proposed design of 
agents capable to obtain information from 
devices and pre-processing it.   
The goals proposed for this stage of development 
were achieved. We have obtained a prototype of 
a functional agent capable of receiving data from 
remote devices safely and reliably. This prototype 
can solve some of the current deficiencies in 
management systems logs. 
At this stage the tests were satisfactory and 
showed the feasibility of the proposed prototype. 
Future work in agents must include: 
 Ipv6 anycast communications between 
agents and devices as part of a fault 
tolerance mechanism.  
 Agents auto-discovery process.  
 Orchestration process implementation and 
communications from agents to devices. 
 Data compressing  
 Data normalization using XLM format 
 Addition of metadata to describe data quality 
 Implement a windows system to reduce the 
impact of packet repetition.  
  Additionally, the orchestration process, the 
transportation protocol between agents and 
servers and system testing scheme should be 
implemented and tested in the future. 
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